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Abstract 
We analyse if consumption can be internationally detached from GDP domestic shocks due to cross border risk
sharing mechanisms. We update the measurement of risk sharing for industrialized OECD countries and for 
several subsets of European ones. We use panel VAR models to capture the dynamic behaviour of cross border 
consumption smoothing through the capital markets, government and credit market channels. We also check
for the substitutability among channels. Finally, we track the evolution of risk sharing over time for each channel.
• The bulk of risk sharing is achieved through the credit markets of savings channel. 
• Risk sharing through international transfers is almost non-existent, while the capital markets channel started to smoothly 
take off after the introduction of the euro. 
• The dynamic behaviour of the channels is different. While in the capital markets channel smoothing takes place mostly on
impact, in the credit channel the initial impact effect is partially compensated by dis-smoothing in the following years. 
• The channels do not act independently as we detect some substitutability among them. 
• Risk sharing has not been constant over time. The credit channel, which was the main channel for cross border smoothing in
Europe, has dried during the last recession and subsequent debt crisis.
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Executive summary  
 
International risk sharing focuses on the cross border channels which are at work in 
smoothing disposable income and consumption when a country is hit by a negative 
output shock. Indeed, in an ideal world of perfect risk sharing, countries are completely 
insured against bad events, and domestic consumption growth will be orthogonal to 
domestic GDP growth. In practice this is rarely the case. Even in well-functioning monetary 
unions like the US, evidence suggests that one quarter of shocks to per capita GDP of 
individual states remains unsmoothed (Asdrubali et al., 1996). We find instead that more 
than 80% of GDP idiosyncratic shocks can remain unsmoothed in the Euro Area and 
the European Union.  
The capability of a system of countries to share risks  not only depends on the cross border 
mechanisms which attenuate fluctuations of disposable income, such as for example 
international asset holdings or international transfers, but also on the domestic pattern of 
savings that can be influenced by domestic fiscal policies. Cross border smoothing in hard 
times is important, as it allows reducing the drop in consumption prompted by crisis, 
sustaining production and growth and insuring the welfare of citizens. The policy relevance 
of the issue of risk sharing has been recently confirmed by the growing attention of both 
the literature and the policy making. In June 2015 the Five President’s Report claimed that 
enhancing risk sharing is indeed a way to mitigate the effect of negative output shocks. 
In our model we follow the relevant literature and decompose risk sharing in three 
channels: (1) the capital markets channel based on the net factor income, (2) the 
government channel, based on international transfers, and (3) the credit markets channel 
that includes savings. This decomposition is motivated by the current harmonised 
structure of national accounts. We use a variety of empirical techniques to measure risk 
sharing among the set of industrialized OECD countries and several subsets including the 
main countries in Europe, the European Union and the Euro Area. This enables us to see 
the differences steaming from being member of the European Union or the Euro Area. The 
period analysed goes from 1960 to 2014, although we also divide our sample in the pre- 
and post-euro ones to check the effects of the introduction of the common currency.  
We find that: 
• The bulk of risk sharing takes place through the credit markets or the saving 
channel. 
• Risk sharing through international transfers is almost non-existent, both 
before and after the introduction of the euro.  
• Capital markets risk sharing seems to be slowly taking off after the introduction 
of the euro.  
Results suggest the existence of room for enhancing the capital market channel via policy 
action. 
Since international consumption smoothing has not only a cross-border dimension but also 
a temporal one, we check the dynamic or intertemporal behaviour of cross-border 
consumption smoothing through the three channels. We not only take into account the 
possible dynamic effect of GDP shocks, but also the feedbacks and the interlinkages among 
the channels.  
We find that not taking into account the dynamic profile of the channels can substantially 
bias our measures of risk sharing. More importantly, we show that the dynamic 
behaviour of the channels is different. While the absorption of a GDP shock through 
the capital markets channel takes place mostly during the same year of the shock, the 
credit channel suffers some dis-smoothing 2 years after a positive shock hitting 
idiosyncratic GDP. As a result, risk sharing through the credit channel might be 
overestimated. For instance, if the inflow of money due to international borrowing through 
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the credit markets channel has a positive effect in a given year, it will instead decrease 
the smoothing capabilities of that channel when the loans have to be paid back. 
 
We also track the evolution of risk sharing along time confirming that it has not been 
constant in our sample. In particular, the last great recession and the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis has dried the credit markets channel in the Euro Area and the 
European Union.  
 
Finally, we do not analyse the channels in isolation, but consider them as a system. Within 
this setup, we are able to check for the relation among the channels and found that they 
behave as substitutes rather than complements. In this sense, if a policy measure is 
foreseen to enhance one of the channels, it might have some negative effect in other 
channels, partially shrinking them.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal paper by Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), ASY from now on, a 
branch of the literature has focused on measuring the degree of risk sharing.  One of the 
main contributions of ASY consisted in providing a variance decomposition scheme which 
allows to separate the overall degree of risk sharing into different channels (capital 
markets, credit markets and international transfers) for a set of economies. Within this 
framework, the interest focuses on the idiosyncratic components or shocks that are given 
by the growth rate of the macroeconomic variable of interest (consumption, GDP, 
income,…) minus the average growth relative to the group of economies included in the 
analysis. They conclude that for the US, markets provide more income and consumption 
risk sharing than the federal government for the period 1963-1990.  Recent reviews of the 
literature of risk sharing can be found in Ahrend, Arnold and Moeser (2011), who point out 
the need to develop collective risk sharing mechanisms, and Pierucci (2014) that reviews 
the empirical literature about risk sharing and the effects of economic and financial 
integration on risk sharing. 
As Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) point out, the recent literature presents conflicting 
results, even for advanced economies. While some studies suggest that risk sharing has 
increased during the recent globalization period (see, for instance, Sorensen, Wu, Yosha 
and Zhu, 2007, and Giannone and Reichlin, 2006), some others found little evidence of 
increased risk sharing (Moser, Pointner and Scharler, 2004, and Bai and Zhang, 2012). 
Moreover, as Balli, Basher and Balli (2013) point out, most findings relate to particular 
periods of time (mostly to an era of financial upturn). For a deeper insight into the 
mechanisms of risk sharing and also in order to explain these conflicting results, Balli, 
Basher and Balli (2013) split the returns from the net foreign holdings into receipts 
(inflows) and payments (outflows) for the set of OECD industrialized countries and found 
that the factor income flow exhibited a remarkable resilience for income risk sharing during 
the last crisis. Hoffman and Sørensen (2015) relate the lack of increased risk sharing in 
Europe to the dependence of the countries from domestic banking sectors. Other authors 
focus on government behavior to explain the results found in the literature. For instance, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini and Sørensen (2014) relate the recent collapse in risk sharing of 
peripheral EU countries (namely, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) to the fact 
that their governments did not save during the expansionary phases of the business cycle 
and were not able to borrow on the international markets during the crisis due to the high 
levels of debt. The last recession and subsequent debt crisis in Europe led to an 
asymmetric behavior of the different member countries of the European Union. In order 
to mitigate the negative effects of the negative output shocks, The Five President’s Report 
(Juncker et al, 2015) points out the need of more integrated financial markets that would 
lead to an increase in private risk sharing as well as the need of a mechanism of fiscal 
stabilization for the euro area as a whole in order to enhance public risk sharing.  The 
European Central Bank (2016) suggests that the quality of risk sharing is also important, 
being foreign direct investment and longer maturity debt more resilient to negative GDP 
shocks and, therefore, more suitable mechanisms to increase consumption smoothing. 
The very basic empirical strategy to assess risk sharing within a particular channel (for 
instance, the net factor income, alias capital markets channel) consists in regressing 
idiosyncratic Net Factor Income shocks, over the idiosyncratic GDP growth. A number 
between 0 and 1 is interpreted as the percentage of risk sharing that is provided by the 
capital market or Net Factor Income channel. The exercise can be repeated for the 
remaining channels as in ASY. The difference between 1 and the sum of the estimated 
parameters for the three channels (net factor income, international transfers and savings) 
is the amount of unsmoothed shocks. If some of the estimated coefficients are negative, 
this means that the channel more than offsets the shock to GDP, while if some parameters 
are greater than 1, this means that the channel amplifies rather than reduces the impact 
of a shock. However, within this approach, dynamic aspects are not taken into account 
and the regressions are run for each particular year or over short panels. Even though 
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GDP shocks were considered exogenous, this would lead to inefficient estimates which can 
explain the heterogeneity of the results obtained. The evolution of risk sharing over time 
is measured as the evolution of the estimated betas, many times, smoothed via kernel 
estimates or other techniques. Cavalieri, Fanelli and Gardini (2008) conclude that the lack 
of European risk sharing found in previous studies could be due to the rich dynamic 
structure underlying European consumption streams. As Valiante (2016) points out, risk 
sharing has not only a cross sectional dimension but a time dimension as well.  
Asdrubali and Kim (2004) introduce panel Vector Auto Regressions (VAR) in the analysis 
of risk sharing and consumption smoothing channels, and found that the dynamic 
properties of the different smoothing channels were heterogeneous. This type of models 
is particularly convenient since they allow to make output endogenous, as well as to take 
into account dynamics and feedbacks among the variables in the model. In this way, we 
are able to check the resilience of consumption to GDP shocks and measure how long does 
it take to absorb a shock. Additionally, within this methodology we are able to answer 
policy issues regarding as whether the different channels have acted as substitutes or 
complements. To capture the possible evolutionary patterns of risk sharing we will 
estimate the models using a rolling window and track the time-varying behavior of the 
different smoothing channels. 
In summary, in this report we focus on several points:  First, we update the measurement 
of risk sharing for a group of industrialized countries commonly used in the empirical 
analysis and for several subsets of European ones through a variety of approaches 
available in the literature. Second, we also use panel VAR models in order to check the 
dynamic or intertemporal behavior of consumption smoothing through the different 
channels identified in the seminal paper by ASY. As a by-product, we are able to make 
output endogenous. Third, we are able to check the extent of substitutability among 
channels. And, finally, we track the evolution of risk sharing along time for each channel. 
The rest of the report is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce the main 
channels for risk sharing and review the literature on risk sharing within the European 
Union. In section 3, we introduce the channels for risk sharing and present the models 
used for our data analysis. In section 4, we describe what goes inside each channel. In 
section 5, we present our empirical results. Finally, in section 6, we present some 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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2. Risk sharing in the EU 
 
In this section, we review the literature related to international risk sharing in Europe in 
order to place our results within the previous empirical evidence. 
Sorensen and Yosha (1998), who also decompose risk sharing into the channels proposed 
by ASY, conclude, using the same econometric techniques, that risk sharing was low in all 
channels for several groups of countries of the EU. However, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and 
Yosha (2004), again using the same empirical strategy, conclude that risk sharing within 
the EU improved over the 90’s due to increased cross-border ownership of assets.  
Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sorensen (2008) use panel regressions for the subsamples 
1995-1999 and 2000-2006 for different groups of EU countries. Following Melitz and 
Zumer (1999) and Sorensen et al. (2007), they allow the beta coefficients to be time-
varying and country-specific. In particular, the betas are modelled as the sum of 3 terms: 
a constant, a time trend and a term that depends on the amount of foreign assets held by 
each country over the aggregate. They find that income risk sharing has been higher in 
the 5 years following the introduction of the euro, but consumption smoothing has 
generally decreased with the only exception of the countries member of the EMU.  
Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini and Sorensen (2014) use the approach of ASY, and implement a 
further decomposition of the channels in order to identify the importance of government 
and private savings in overall risk sharing, finding that risk sharing collapsed in Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in 2010 since positive government saving induced dis-
smoothing, i.e. negative smoothing. 
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2015), again following the empirical approach of ASY look at risk 
sharing in 15 countries of the Euro Area for the period 1979-2010 and found that 66% of 
the shocks in the EA are not smoothed, and that smoothing is mainly achieved via private 
saving (around 22%). They also simulate the theoretical effect of a supranational fiscal 
mechanism of risk sharing. 
Kalemli-Ozcan (2016) stresses that the Eurozone crisis caused a dry up in external 
financing sources provided by capital flows in several countries. For a fast recovery she 
points out that the Eurozone needs a banking union and a broader financial union based 
on equity ownership rather than on debt.  
The Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (European Commission, 2016) compares risk 
sharing estimates in the EU to those for the US, and concludes that the Eurozone lags 
behind the US and that there is room for increasing shock smoothing, especially through 
the capital market channel. Moreover, the report estimates that the direct impact of output 
shocks on consumption is almost four times bigger in the Eurozone than it is in the US. 
Buti, Leandro and Nikolov (2016) highlight that there is space for improving international 
risk sharing in the Eurozone and Carnot, Evans, Fatica and Mourre (2015) design several  
hypothetical macroeconomic insurance schemes that could improve risk sharing in the 
euro area. 
All in all, the literature dealing with risk sharing in the Euro Area points out that its extent 
is much lower than that estimated for the US, especially regarding private risk sharing. 
Moreover, it collapsed during the financial and sovereign debt crisis in peripheral European 
countries. 
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3. Channels and models for risk sharing 
 
Following the structure in the System of National Accounts, ASY identified three channels 
for risk sharing: capital market channel, the fiscal channel and the credit market channel. 
Recall that in national accounts the Net Factor Income (NFI) is given by the gross national 
income minus the gross domestic product, the Net International Transfers (NIT) are given 
by gross disposable income minus gross national income and Savings (S) are measured 
as gross disposable income minus consumption. Taking into account the previous structure 
in national accounts, ASY consider the following identity as the starting point to identify 
the channels for risk sharing  
ܩܦܲ = ܩܦܲܩܰܫ
ܩܰܫ
ܩܦܫ
ܩܦܫ
ܥ ܥ 
where GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product, GNI for Gross National Income, GDI for 
Gross Disposable Income and C for Consumption. Taking logs and first differences, 
subtracting the cross-sectional average, multiplying both sides by ∆log(GDP) (minus its 
mean) and after taking expectations, we can decompose the cross sectional variance of 
GDP growth rates into different components: First, the covariance between ∆log(GDP) - 
∆log(GNI) and ∆log(GDP). Second, the covariance between ∆log(GNI) - ∆log(GDI) and 
∆log(GDP), that is cross-border fiscal redistribution. Third, the covariance between savings 
growth rates and ∆log(GDP). Lastly, dividing both sides of the variance decomposition by 
the variance of the idiosyncratic GDP growth rates, we end up with the following identity: 
1 = ߚ௄ + ߚி + ߚ஼ + ߚ௎ 
where ߚ௄ is interpreted as the amount of risk-sharing (in percentage to 1) that takes place 
through the Net Factor Income or capital markets channel, ߚி is the amount of smoothing 
achieved through international transfers or the government channel, ߚ஼ is the amount of 
risk sharing achieved through savings or the credit market channel and ߚ௎ is the amount 
of shocks that remains unsmoothed. The names of the channels are those given in the 
seminal paper by ASY and we do not pretend to change them here. However, in Section 
4, we will clarify what goes inside each channel.  
The previous coefficients can be estimated through the following regressions where all the 
variables but the error terms are considered shocks measured as deviations from the 
aggregate. 
Δlog(GDP) − 	Δlog(GNI) = ߚ଴,௄ + ߚ௄Δlog(GDP) + ݑ௄   (1) 
Δlog(GNI) − 	Δlog(GDI) = ߚ଴,ி + ߚிΔlog(GDP) + ݑி   (2) 
Δlog(GDI) − 	Δlog(C) = ߚ଴,஼ + ߚ஼Δlog(GDP) + ݑ஼    (3) 
Δlog(C) = ߚ଴,௎ + ߚ௎Δlog(GDP) + ݑ௎     (4) 
If ߚ௎ = 0, there is full risk sharing. On the contrary, if ߚ௎ > 0, GDP shocks are, at least, 
partially passed to consumption. In the extreme case of ߚ௎ > 1, GDP shocks are amplified 
rather than smoothed. As mentioned before, the amount of unsmoothed output shocks is 
estimated as 1 − ߚ௄ − ߚி − ߚ஼ . Further decompositions of the basic channels can be 
achieved if we go beyond in the System of National Accounts; see, for instance, Balli, 
Pericoli and Pierucci (2014) for the decomposition of the net factor income channel into 
interests, dividends and retained earnings or Kalemli-Ozcan, Luttini and Sorensen (2014) 
for decomposing savings into private and public savings.  In our analysis, and in order to 
compare our results to other analysis available in the literature, we will continue to work 
with the standard decomposition into three channels of risk sharing. 
In order to capture the serial correlation that might be present in the data, and following 
the usual practice in the literature, we allow for an AR(1) process in the error term. 
However, there are additional issues not contemplated in the previous models. First, we 
would like to consider GDP endogenous as the dependent variable (i.e., consumption in 
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equation 4) is a component of the explanatory variable (GDP) itself, which might imply 
biased estimates of the smoothing parameters as well as for the degree of risk sharing 
that remains unsmoothed, due to simultaneity bias.1 Second, the previous setup estimates 
risk sharing in an isolated way not contemplating any possible link among the channels. 
Third, the different dynamic behavior of the channels was characterized by Asdrubali and 
Kim (2004), who differentiate between risk sharing channels that provide ex-ante 
insurance (as capital channel through asset markets) and channels that provide 
intertemporal smoothing ex-post via credit markets. Government smoothing, or fiscal 
stabilizers, can work both as ex-ante or ex-post smoothing channel. Through a panel VAR, 
we can make output endogenous, characterize the dynamic role of each smoothing 
channel and interrelate them.  
Within this dynamic panel approach our basic model is 
௜ܺ,௧ = ܣ଴,௜ + ܣଵ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ + ܣଶ ௜ܺ,௧ିଶ + ⋯+ ܣ௣ ௜ܺ,௧ି௣ + ௜ܷ,௧ 
where for each country and each time period ௜ܺ,௧ is the 4 × 1 vector   
௜ܺ,௧=(	ΔlogGDP௜,௧, ΔlogGDP௜,௧ − ΔlogGNI௜,௧, ΔlogGNI௜,௧ − ΔlogGDI௜,௧, ΔlogGDI௜,௧ − ΔlogC௜,௧	)′		, 
ܣ଴,௜ is the 4x1 vector of intercepts that can be country specific,  ܣ௝, j=1,…,p are 4 × 4 
matrices of coefficients  and ௜ܷ,௧ is multivariate white noise. The coefficient matrices are 
the same for all countries included in the panel so we can pool all the information to get 
more precise estimates. The inclusion of as many lags as needed to clean the residuals 
can make the noise free from serial correlation. We also assume stationarity since all the 
variables are measured as deviations from the aggregate in growth rates. This is a reduced 
form model free from any issue regarding endogeneity. We contemplate two different 
specifications and consider a common intercept (in this case ܣ଴,௜ = ܣ଴ for all countries) and, 
alternatively, specific intercepts for each country.  
In this setup, a shock is meant to the whole channel and we can compute its dynamic 
effect through impulse response functions. Additionally, we can check how a shock in one 
channel affects the remaining ones. 
  
                                           
1 As we will see in the empirical section, in our analysis this leads to an underestimation 
of the overall degree of unsmoothed shocks.  
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4. What’s inside each channel? 
 
In this report we maintain the names of the channels introduced in the seminal paper by 
ASY, as it is done in the literature, so they can be compared with those found in other 
analyses. However, in what follows, we will describe what goes into each channel for a 
better understanding of the mechanism of risk-sharing thorough each one of them. The 
data we are using come from the System of National Accounts and the channels are 
matched with its structure. What follows is not intended to give an exhaustive description 
of the System of National Accounts and the Balance of Payments but to give further insight 
of how the difference channels might work knowing what is inside each one of them.  
The capital markets channel comprises the net factor income (NFI). This channel is 
made out of two types of transactions between residents and non-residents of a particular 
country. On the one hand, compensations to employees that are non-residents and, on 
the other hand, investment income receipts and payments on external financial assets and 
liabilities.  The compensations to employees exclude migrants, that is, those that live in 
the foreign country more than one year and as the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 
(2016) reveals cross border labour compensation accounts for a very small fraction of 
consumption smoothing in the Euro Area, being even negative for some subsets of 
countries. So the bulk of risk sharing within this channel is realized through investment 
income. The latter comprises income from foreign direct investment, portfolio investment 
income and other investment income. The two most important sources of investment 
income are: payments on debt securities (interests) and on equity securities (dividends). 
Notice that capital gains and losses do not go onto this channel since they are classified 
as part of the value of the investments. 
The so called fiscal or government channel (or public risk-sharing) includes transfers 
made by a resident entity to a non-resident entity without an economic counterpart. 
Included in this channel are general government transfers and current transfers between 
other sectors. The first one comprises transfers between governments and international 
cooperation. Examples of entries that go into this channel are cash transfers between 
governments in order to finance current expenditures; gifts of food, international aid for 
earthquakes or natural disasters; gifts on certain military equipment and regular 
contributions paid by member governments to international organizations and vice versa. 
Included here are also transfers between governments and non-residents other than 
governments and international organizations. For instance, current taxes on income or 
social security contributions between a government and the non-resident are included 
here. International transfers made between other sectors include workers’ remittances by 
migrants (staying in the foreign country for more than one year) and international 
transfers between private entities aimed to alleviate poverty and the consequences of 
natural disasters.  
The third channel in risk sharing is the so called credit channel or gross savings which is 
the balancing item in the system of national accounts between disposable income and final 
consumption, which comprises not only household savings, but also corporate and 
government savings. Notice that this channel has also a domestic connotation since agents 
can smooth consumption by borrowing and lending not only in international markets but 
also in domestic ones or by investing less.   
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5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. Data set 
 
We have taken annual data from National Accounts that cover the timespan 1960-2014. 
For comparisons with the available literature, the set of OECD countries included in the 
analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.  In this way, we cover the 
industrialized countries and can also form subsets that comprise the main economies in 
Europe, the European Union and the Euro Area. Just the aggregated GDP of Germany, 
Italy, France and Spain accounts for 2/3 of the Euro Area GDP. The main sources of data 
for this analysis are AMECO, the annual macro-economic database of the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), and the 
database OECD Statistics. We prefer to use the AMECO database since it provides 
harmonized statistics on all of the variables required to perform the analysis and for the 
whole sample 1960-2014, leaving some missing information only in a very limited number 
of cases.  
The nominal variables Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Net Factor Income (NFI), Gross 
National Income (GNI), Net International Transfers (NIT), Gross Disposable Income, (GDI) 
and Consumption (C) have been taken from AMECO.  Then, they have been deflated by 
the CPI, (base year 2010=100) and computed in per-capita terms by dividing the real 
aggregates by the population. The series have been made stationary by computing their 
logged differences, which gives the annual growth rates of the real per-capita variables.   
To build the idiosyncratic shocks of each variable we have computed the difference 
between each variable and the cross-country weighted average. In order to construct the 
averages, we have used exchange rates, following the weighting procedure described in 
Beyer et al. (2001), where the aggregation is performed directly on growth rates but using 
time-varying weights of countries that are given by their relative share in the real GDP in 
EUR-ECU.  In order to express real GDPs in a common EUR-ECU currency, the real series 
have been divided by the exchange rate series provided also by AMECO. 
We have also built a second database where the macro aggregates are transformed into 
Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) units by dividing the nominal aggregates for the 
appropriate PPS exchange rate reported by AMECO. We have transformed them into real 
per-capita idiosyncratic shocks to growth rates making the necessary computations.  
Full details of how we build the databases as well as the treatment of missing data are 
given in Appendix 1. 
 
5.2.  Estimation Strategy 
 
Given the long timespan of our sample, we estimate the models for the whole sample as 
well as for two subsamples 1960-1998 and 1999-2014 in order to check the effect of the 
introduction of the euro. Our estimated parameters can be interpreted as the average risk 
sharing that took place over the years covered in each subsample.  
Moreover, we analyse how the extent of international risk sharing has evolved over time 
in the same spirit as Kose et al. (2009). We will use a rolling window of 20 years to 
estimate the panel VAR model. In this way, we can check, for instance, how the last 
recession and sovereign debt crisis in Europe has affected the level of risk sharing. For 
comparison purposes, we add the cross country regressions run year by year as in Kose 
et al. (2009). 
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We would like to comment the following econometric issues: first, we view risk sharing as 
a problem regarding the specific shocks, that is short or mid-term fluctuations of 
idiosyncratic variables, so we do not need to take into account any cointegration issues, 
as we are working with time series which are all ܫ(0). Second, regarding the assumption 
of exogeneity of output shocks that it is taken in the literature, we notice that violations 
of this assumption might come from several sources (estimation error in the dependent 
variables, simultaneity bias …). Even though our regression equations are considered just 
as linear projections of the dependent variables onto the regressors, we prefer to check 
the robustness of our results moving to a fully simultaneous and dynamic panel VAR 
framework in order to consider output as an endogenous variable. Within the panel VAR 
we can also take into account the dynamic interactions among the different channels and 
the dynamic profile of how each shock is disseminated through the different channels. As 
an overall effect of risk sharing we use the accumulated impulse response function. Third, 
when needed we use robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
for inference. Alternatively, we take into account the possible serial correlation in the static 
or contemporaneous models allowing for AR(1) residuals and heteroscedasticity using 2-
steps Generalized Least Squares (GLS) when estimating equations (1) to (4) in the 
regression framework. We also contemplate fixed time effects. We have also checked the 
possibility of cross sectional fixed effects. However, the estimated betas hardly change 
because our variables are already computed as deviations from the aggregate in first 
differences  
We estimate the results for 4 sets of countries: (i) the whole data set named hereinafter 
ALL, (ii) the European countries denoted by Europe, (iii) the set of countries that belong 
to the European Union, EU, and (iv) the countries that belong to the Euro Area, denoted 
by EA. 
 
5.3. Empirical results 
 
 
For brevity, and given that the results are qualitatively the same, in this section we only 
show them for the database built in terms of PPS, but full results are available from the 
authors upon request. Table 1 shows the results from three estimation methods: 
Univariate panel estimation, simultaneous panel estimation and panel VAR. The estimation 
was performed for the whole sample as well as for the two subsamples of interest 
mentioned in the previous section in order to compare them among themselves and with 
those available in the literature. By rows, we can see the degree of risk sharing achieved 
through the capital markets channel (KAP), from international transfers or the so called 
government channel (GOV) and from the credit markets channel (CRE). The row named 
as UNS represents the amount of unsmoothed shocks. The final row N represents the 
number of data points within each sample (full sample, pre-euro and post-euro). By 
columns, the table should be read as follows: for each sample, the first column, denoted 
as univariate panel (univariate panel) shows the results of the estimation of each channel 
separately using 2 steps GLS with time and fixed effects and autocorrelated AR(1) errors. 
The second column, denoted as SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations), shows 
the results of the simultaneous estimation of the three channels, again with country and 
time fixed effects and AR(1) errors. Finally, the 3rd and 4th columns show the estimation 
results from the panel VAR. The 3rd column shows risk sharing on impact or 
contemporaneous smoothing while the 4th column shows the accumulated effect over time. 
In order to compare the results across different methodologies, we have followed Asdrubali 
and Kim (2004), normalizing the accumulated impact of a GDP shock to GDP as 100 and 
reported the fraction passed out through the channels, on impact and accumulated over 
time. Within each channel, each cell has two numbers: our estimate of the degree of risk 
sharing (as a share of 1) and in parenthesis its standard deviation. For example, in the 
overall sample, the number 0.7488 that appears under the column Panel VAR impact in 
the cell corresponding to the unsmoothed shocks (UNS) means that on impact, the same 
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year that the shock takes places, during the sample that goes from 1960 to 2014, on 
average, around 75% of GDP shocks were not smoothed and, therefore, passed into 
consumption. 
 
 
Table 1: Risk sharing estimates for the sample of 21 OECD countries. The set of countries comprises 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United 
States. KAP stands for the capital markets channel, GOV for the government channel and CRE from the 
credit markets channel; UNS is the degree (as a share of 1) of unsmoothed shocks. 
 
 Sample: 21 OECD Member States
 
1960-2014 1960-1998 1999-2014 
  
Univ. 
panel  
Sure  Panel  
VAR 
Impact 
Panel 
VAR  
accum 
Univ
 panel  
Sure 
 
Panel 
VAR 
impact 
Panel
 VAR 
Accum
u 
Univ
 panel  
Sure  Panel  
VAR 
impact 
Panel 
VAR 
accum 
KAP 
.0041 
 (.0042) 
.0094 
(.0099) 
.0051 
(.0069) 
.0208 
(.0076) 
-.0053
(.0027) 
-.0067 
(.0062) 
-.0105
(.0052) 
.0019
(.0075) 
.0376
(.0091) 
.0551 
 (.0283) 
.0395 
(.0185) 
.0875
(.0318) 
GOV  
-.0011  
(.0017) 
-.0016 
(.0037) 
-.0008 
(.0025) 
.0107 
(.0059) 
.0059 
(.0015) 
.0083
(.0041) 
.0017
(.0034) 
.0105
(.0075) 
-.0034
(.0023) 
-.0016 
(.0049) 
-.0049 
(.0032) 
.0096
(.0300) 
CRE 
.3137  
(.0161) 
.3363 
(.0212) 
.2469 
(.0154) 
.1916 
(.0157) 
.3603 
(.0152) 
.3561
(.0198) 
.2510
(.0185) 
.2074
(.0187) 
.3743
(.0196) 
.3436 
(.0405) 
.2399 
(.0283) 
.1291
(.0321) 
UNS 
.6833 .6559 .7488 .7768 .6391 .6423 .7578 .7802 .5911 .7131 .7256 .7738
N 
1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 798 798 798 336 336 336 336
 
 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 1: 
 
(i) All the estimates point out that risk sharing through international transfers has 
been almost non-existent, both before and after the introduction of the euro. 
(ii) Capital markets risk sharing seems to be higher in the post-EMU sample. Not 
taking into account the endogeneity and dynamics seem to bias the estimates 
downward. 
(iii) The credit market channel estimations from the panel VAR are, in general, lower 
than those from the static panel models. This might reflect the fact that loans 
have to be repaid and following a contemporaneous positive smoothing, it 
comes certain dis-smoothing due to this payment back. 
(iv) The fraction of unsmoothed shocks seems to be underestimated around 10 
points when not taking into account properly dynamics and the endogeneity of 
output. 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix 2 present equivalent results for the subset of European 
countries (Table 2), the subset of European Union countries (Table 3) and the subset of 
countries of the Euro Area (Table 4).  
We can draw the same conclusions for the set of European countries. However, although 
the same conclusions can be drawn for the subsets of EU and EA countries, the degree of 
unsmoothed shocks seems to be higher in the second part of the sample. More precisely, 
the credit channel dried out in the post euro sample, probably due to the recent great 
recession and subsequent debt crisis. 
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To check the dynamic behaviour of each of the channels, we plot in Figure 1 the impulse 
response functions of the three channels to a GDP shock. Recall that in order to compare 
the results across different methodologies, we have followed Asdrubali and Kim (2004), 
normalizing the accumulated impact of a GDP shock to GDP as 100 and computed the 
fraction passed out through the channels along time. The analysis of the picture reveals 
no action in the capital markets and government channels. The figure also shows that the 
credit market smooths more than 20% of the shock on impact, but after 2 years we found 
a significant negative contribution showing some dis-smoothing. The same analysis can 
be found in Appendix 3 for the sets of countries in the sample within Europe, the EU and 
the Euro Area. We see a similar dynamic behaviour of the channels in all the subsets 
analysed. 
 
 
Figure 1: Impulse response functions of the capital markets (top panel), government (government 
panel) and credit channel (bottom panel) to a GDP shock. The red line reflects the point estimates and 
the blue dotted lines are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Sample 
1960-2014. 
 
The impulse response analysis of the different channels to a shock in each one of them is 
useful to check if the channels act as substitutes or complements. Figure 2 shows the 
impulse response functions for the set of industrialized OECD countries. Equivalent figures 
can be found in Appendix 3 for the remaining sets of countries in our analysis. We can 
conclude that the channels act as substitutes rather than complements and that following 
a positive shock to one of the channels might come some dis-smoothing through an 
alternative channel. This should be kept in mind when trying to enhance a particular 
channel through some policy measure, since it might induce some undesired effect in 
another channel. 
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions of each channel to a shock in the alternative channels. The red 
line reflects the point estimates and the blue dotted lines are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries 
comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States. Sample 1960-2014. 
 
 
 
5.4 Evolution of risk sharing over time 
 
For a further insight on how the last great recession and subsequent sovereign debt crisis 
has affected  risk sharing and to check if the main results are maintained over time or 
depend on the particular sample analysed, we use a rolling window of 20 years to estimate 
the panel VAR model being the first sample 1961-1980 and the last sample 1995-2014 
and check for the evolution along time of our estimations in the four sets of countries we 
are analyzing, representing the main countries in the OECD, Europe, EU and Euro Area. 
In order to compare our results, we also add the cross country yearly regressions in the 
same spirit of Kose et al. (2009). In this way, we can check, for instance, how the last 
recession and sovereign debt crisis in Europe has affected the level of risk sharing. 
 
Figure 3 shows the results for risk sharing for the three channels given by the cross section 
regressions repeated year by year. We also plot 95% confidence bands computed using 
standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  
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Figure 3: Estimated betas from year by year cross section regressions; top panel: capital markets, 
middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk sharing. Red line are point 
estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United 
States. The time span goes from 1960 to 2014.  
 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the picture are: (i) first, risk sharing 
through capital markets is very low, hardly different from zero (statistically 
significant in very few years). Recently, it also seems more volatile; (ii) second, 
public risk sharing has been almost non-existent and even caused dis-smoothing 
in the last years; and (iii) the bulk of risk sharing takes place through savings, alias 
credit markets channel. The picture also shows the effect of the last recession and 
subsequent debt crisis drying out this last channel. 
 
The same analysis was performed for the subsets of European countries, the subset 
of countries within the EU and the subset of countries that belong to the euro area 
and is shown in Appendix 3. The results are qualitatively the same although the 
estimations become more volatile and confidence bands widen as we have less data 
points to compute our estimates. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the results for the sample of industrialized OECD countries 
from the panel VAR estimation. Figure 4 shows the effect on impact and Figure 5 
the accumulated or overall effect over a period of 10 years. Given that this model 
takes into account dynamics and uses a rolling window of 20 years and, therefore 
two consecutive samples of 20 years only differ in 1 data point, the estimates 
exhibit a large degree of smoothness.  
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Figure 4: Estimated risk-sharing on impact from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 years; 
top panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk 
sharing. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States. 
 
We can draw the following conclusions: the main channel for risk sharing is again 
the credit channel, although, in general, we can see that the accumulated effect is 
smaller than the effect on impact. Therefore, following some smoothing through 
this channel on impact, there is some dis-smoothing the following years. The dis-
smoothing effect is not observed in the other two channels: capital markets and 
international transfers. The second channel for achieving consumption smoothing 
seems to be the capital markets channel. Contrary to other studies, we find that 
this channel is growing since the introduction of the euro, although it still remains 
at lower values than the credit market. Finally, as regards international transfers, 
smoothing through this channel is non-existent.  
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Figure 5: Accumulated risk-sharing from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 years; top 
panel: capital markets channel, middle panel: government channel, bottom panel: credit channel. N=21 
OECD industrialized countries. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence 
bands. The set of countries comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
 
Again, the same analysis was performed for the subsets of European countries, EU 
countries and those that belong to the euro area and is shown in Appendix 3. The 
results are qualitatively the same although we can see that the effect of the crisis 
is much more severe, especially in the euro area countries. 
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
 
We have estimated the degree of risk sharing among a group of OECD countries, and 
several subsets within Europe, the EU and the EA using panel VAR models that can cope 
with the issue of endogeneity of output and appropriately take into account dynamics 
and feedback among the channels and the channels and GDP.  We have compared our 
results with more standard alternatives and found that the degree of unsmoothed 
shocks might be underestimated. However, the main picture remains unaltered: the 
bulk of risk sharing takes place through the credit channel; public risk sharing seems 
to be non-existent and the capital markets channel is slowing taking off since the 
introduction of the euro. So there is room for enhancing risk sharing, especially, through 
the capital markets channel. 
 
With panel VAR models we are able to analyse the dynamic behaviour of each channel 
discovering the different dynamic response achieved through the different channels.  
This might be due to de fact that some channels act ex-ante (the capital markets 
channel), some can act ex-post after a negative shock hits the economy (the credit 
channel) while the government channel can act both ex-ante and ex-post. The credit 
channel, which is the main driver of risk sharing in the various sets of countries 
analysed, has also a longer dynamic response, and after some smoothing when a GDP 
idiosyncratic shock hits an economy, it follows some dis-smoothing in subsequent 
periods, perhaps due to payback duties after borrowing in international credit markets.  
On the contrary, the small effect that we observe in the capital markets channel occurs 
on impact and decays quickly. 
As a by-product of our analysis, we also obtain that the channels act as substitutes and 
if a positive shock hits one of the channels, it might partially dry the remaining channels. 
For instance, if a positive shock hits the government channel, the credit channel might 
shrink to some extent. This should be taken into account for policy purposes. 
Using a rolling window of 20 years we are can conclude that the big picture is maintained 
through time although we can see the effect of the last great recession and subsequent 
debt crisis drying the credit channel, especially in the EU and the Euro Area. 
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Appendix 1: The Dataset 
The construction of the dataset employed to estimate the econometric model for risk 
sharing has followed the criteria usually employed in this strand of literature, as explained 
for example in Asdrubali and Kim (2004). 
The statistical sources are AMECO, the annual macro-economic database of the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), and the 
database OECD Statistics. 
In detail, we consider data for a subset of 21 OECD countries,2 for years 1960-2014. The 
series included in the analysis are: 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices, expressed in billions of units of 
local currency. Source: AMECO. 
• Net Factor Income (NFI) at current prices, expressed in billions of units of local 
currency. Source: AMECO.3 4   
• Gross National Product (GNP) has been computed by applying the following identity 
GNP = GDP + NFI. 
• Net International Transfers (NIT) at current prices, expressed in billions of units of 
local currency. Source: AMECO.5 6 
• Gross Disposable Income (GDI) has been computed with the following identity GDI 
= GNP + NIT. 
• Consumption (C) at current prices, expressed in billions of units of local currency. 
Source: AMECO. 
• Consumer Price Index (2000=100). Source: OECD.7 
• Population (POP). Source: OECD. 
• EUR-ECU Exchange rate (EXR): Units of national currency per EUR/ECU. Source: 
AMECO. 
• PPS Exchange rate (PPS): Units of national currency per PPS. Source: AMECO. 
In the first dataset the nominal variables (GDP, NFI, GNP, NIT, GDI, C) have been deflated 
with the CPI and have been computed in per-capita terms by dividing them by POP. Then, 
the series have been made stationary by computing the logged difference, which gives the 
annual growth rate of the real per-capita variables. Differently, in the second dataset the 
nominal variables (GDP, NFI, GNP, NIT, GDI, C) have been deflated instead by means of 
the PPS exchange rate. In the panel VAR model we included the idiosyncratic component 
of growth rates, given by the difference of each variable from the cross-country weighted 
average. In order to construct the averages, we have followed the weighting procedure 
                                           
2 The 22 OECD countries included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United 
States. 
3 For Germany, data for years 1960-1990 are missing. For years 1960-1989 the series for 
Germany is proxied by the series for West-Germany, while data for 1990 has been 
interpolated to smooth the discontinuity. 
4 For New Zealand, data for years 1970 and 2014 are missing. Data for 1970 has been 
linearly interpolated, while data for 2014 has been estimated by (GNP-GDP). 
5 For Germany, data for years 1960-1990 are missing. For the period 1960-1989 the series 
for Germany is proxied by the series for West-Germany, while data for 1990 has been 
linearly interpolated to smooth the discontinuity. 
6 For New Zealand, data for years 1970 and 2014 are missing. Data for 1970 has been 
linearly interpolated, while data has for 2014 has been estimated by (GDI-GNP), where 
GDI is estimated with the growth rate of Disposable Net Income (Source: OECD). 
7 For Denmark (years 1960-1966), Ireland (years 1960-1975) and Netherlands (year 
1960) data are missing and are estimated with the growth rate of the corresponding series 
from AMECO. 
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described in Beyer et al. (2001), where it is recommended of aggregating growth rates 
rather than levels, by employing the time-varying weights of countries given by the real 
GDP in EUR-ECU, and obtained by dividing GDP in national currency for EXR and CPI.  
 24 
 
Appendix 2: Tables 
 
Table 2: Risk sharing estimates for the sample of European countries. The set of countries comprises Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. KAP stands for the capital markets channel, GOV for the government 
channel and CRE from the credit markets channel; UNS is the degree (as a share of 1) of unsmoothed shocks. 
 
Sample: Europe
 
1960-2014 1960-1998 1999-2014
 
Univ. 
panel 
Sure 
Panel 
VAR 
impact 
Panel 
VAR 
accum. 
Univ 
panel 
Sure 
 
Panel 
VAR 
Impact 
Panel 
VAR 
accum. 
Univ 
panel 
Sure  
Panel 
VAR 
impact 
Panel 
VAR 
accum. 
KAP 
-.0075 
(.00612) 
.0093 
(.01142) 
0.0049 
(.0092) 
0.0206
(.0100) 
-.0140 
(.0053) 
-.0111
(.0078) 
-0.0106
(.0069) 
-0.0064
(.0096) 
.0399 
(.0095) 
.0605 
(.0342) 
0.0332
(.0234) 
0.0867
(.0400) 
GOV 
.0015 
(.0029) 
.0069 
(.0043) 
-0.0029 
(.0035) 
0.0154 
(.0071) 
.00434 
(.0032) 
.0010 
(.0056) 
-0.0012 
(.0048) 
0.0158 
(.0091) 
-.0038 
(.0028) 
-.0010 
(.0060) 
-0.0044 
(.0041) 
0.0123 
(.0347) 
CRE 
.3464 
(.0201) 
.3441 
(.0222) 
0.2751 
(.0190) 
0.1961 
(.0197) 
.3607 
(.0205) 
.3568 
(.0244) 
0.2839 
(.0231) 
0.2274 
(.0237) 
.3451 
(.0240) 
.3123 
(.0477) 
0.2610 
(.0333) 
0.1348 
(.0430) 
UNS 
0.6596 0.6397 0.7229 0.7679 0.6490 0.6533 0.7279 0.7632 0.6188 0.6282 0.7102 0.7662
N 864 864 864 864 608 608 608 608 256 256 256 
256
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Table 3: Risk sharing estimates for the sample of countries belonging to the European Union. The set of countries 
comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. KAP stands for the capital markets channel, GOV for the government 
channel and CRE from the credit markets channel; UNS is the degree (as a share of 1) of unsmoothed shocks. 
Sample: European Union  
 
1960-2014 1960-1998 1999-2014 
 
Univ. 
panel  
Sure  Panel 
VAR 
impact 
Panel 
VAR  
accum. 
Univ
 panel  
Sure 
 
Panel VAR
impact 
Panel 
 VAR 
accum. 
Univ
 panel  
Sure  Panel  
VAR 
impact 
Panel 
VAR 
accum. 
KAP -.0122 
(.0068) 
.0060 
(.0099) 
0.0034 
(.0082) 
0.0199 
(.0091) 
-.0107 
(.0060) 
-.0095 
(.0083) 
-0.0066 
(.0076) 
-0.0125 
(.0106) 
.0168 
(.0141) 
.0540 
(.0290) 
0.0045 
(.0184) 
0.0853 
(.0372) 
GOV  .0071 
(.0035) 
.0091 
(.0049) 
0.0015 
(.0039) 
0.017 
(.0074) 
.0059 
(.0040) 
.0100 
(.0062) 
-0.0021 
(.0055) 
0.0135 
(.0100) 
.0042 
(.0033) 
.00645 
(.0069) 
0.0011 
(.0044) 
0.0203 
(.0321) 
CRE .3091 
(.0217) 
.2970 
(.0226) 
0.238 
(.0190) 
0.1692 
(.0194) 
.3437 
(.0224) 
.3410 
(.0260) 
0.2869 
(.0246) 
0.2511 
(.0251) 
.1946 
(.0308) 
.1614 
(.0443) 
0.1418 
(.0278) 
0.0020 
(.0341) 
UNS 0.6960 0.6879 0.7669 0.7939 0.6611 0.6585 0.7218 0.7479 0.7844 0.7782 0.8526 0.8964 
N 756 756 756 756 532 532 532 532 224 224 224 
224
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Table 4: Risk sharing estimates for the sample of countries belonging to the Euro Area. The set of countries 
comprises Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. KAP 
stands for the capital markets channel, GOV for the government channel and CRE from the credit markets 
channel; UNS is the degree (as a share of 1) of unsmoothed shocks. 
 
 
  
Sample: Euro Area 
 
1960-2014 1960-1998 1999-2014 
 
Univ. 
panel  
Sure  Panel  
VAR 
impact 
Panel 
VAR  
accum. 
Univ 
 panel  
Sure  
 
Panel 
VAR 
impact 
Panel  
 VAR 
accum. 
Univ 
 panel  
Sure  Panel  
VAR 
impact 
Panel  
VAR 
accum. 
KAP .0051 
(.0083) 
.0136 
(.0113) 
0.0023 
(.0091) 
0.0257 
(.0103) 
.0046 
(.0075) 
.0028 
(.0095) 
0.0019 
(.0088) 
0.0091 
(.0129) 
.0241 
(.0192) 
.0604 
(.0323) 
0.0113 
(.0195) 
0.086 
(.0398) 
GOV .0083 
(.0049) 
.0077 
(.0057) 
-0.0038 
(.0044) 
0.021 
(.0090) 
.0049 
(.0036) 
.0075 
(.0073) 
0.0045 
(.0064) 
0.0169 
(.0124) 
.0039 
(.0051) 
.0083 
(.0077) 
-0.0003 
(.0047) 
0.0241 
(.0384) 
CRE .3245 
(.0263) 
.3053 
(.0259) 
0.2471 
(.0213) 
0.1777 
(.0218) 
.3617 
(.0274) 
.3568 
(.0302) 
0.3112 
(.0289) 
0.277 
(.0295) 
.2477 
(.0457) 
.1587 
(.0485) 
0.1307 
(.0284) 
0.0001 
(.0388) 
UNS 0.6723 0.6734 0.7544 0.7756 0.6380 0.6385 0.6952 0.7152 0.7243 0.7726 0.8583 0.8898 
N 594 594 594 594 418 418 418 418 176 176 176 176 
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Appendix 3: Figures 
Appendix 3.1: Impulse response functions 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.1: Impulse response functions of the capital markets (top panel), government (middle 
panel) and credit channel (bottom panel) to a GDP shock.  N=16 Core European countries. Red line are 
point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Sample 1960-2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2: Impulse response functions of the capital markets (top panel), government (middle 
panel) and credit channel (bottom panel) to a GDP shock. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted 
line are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Sample 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.1.3: Impulse response functions of the capital markets (top panel), government (middle 
panel) and credit channel (bottom panel) to a GDP shock. sharing. Core EA countries. Red line are point 
estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Sample 1960-2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 29 
 
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of KAP to GOV
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of KAP to CRE
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of GOV to KAP
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of GOV to CRE
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of CRE to KAP
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of CRE to GOV
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Figure 3.1.4: Impulse response functions of each channel to a shock in the alternative channels. The 
red line reflects the point estimates and the blue dotted lines are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Sample 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.1.5: Impulse response functions of each channel to a shock in the alternative channels. The 
red line reflects the point estimates and the blue dotted lines are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Sample 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.1.6: Impulse response functions of each channel to a shock in the alternative channels. The 
red line reflects the point estimates and the blue dotted lines are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. Sample 1960-2014. 
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Appendix 3.2: Evolution of risk sharing over time 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1: Estimated betas from year by year cross section regressions; top panel: capital markets, 
middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk sharing. N=16 Core European 
countries. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The time span goes 
from 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.2.2: Estimated betas from cross section regressions; top panel: capital markets, middle panel: 
public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk sharing. N=14 core EU countries. Red line are 
point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. The time span goes from 1960-2014. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3: Estimated betas from cross section regressions; top panel: capital markets, middle panel: 
public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk sharing. N=11 core EA countries. Red line are 
point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of countries comprises Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The time span goes 
from 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.2.4: Estimated risk-sharing on impact from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 
years; top panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings 
risk sharing. European countries. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence 
bands. The set of countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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Figure 3.2.5: Accumulated risk-sharing from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 years; 
top panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk 
sharing. European countries. The set of countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and United Kingdom. 
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Figure 3.2.6: Estimated risk-sharing on impact from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 
years; top panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings 
risk sharing. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. The time span goes from 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.2.7: Accumulated risk-sharing from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 years; top 
panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk sharing. 
European countries. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The 
set of countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. The time span goes from 1960-2014. 
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Figure 3.2.8: Estimated risk-sharing on impact from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 
years; top panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings 
risk sharing. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. 
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Figure 3.2.9: Accumulated risk-sharing from panel VAR models using a rolling window of 20 years; 
top panel: capital markets, middle panel: public risk sharing, bottom panel: credit and savings risk 
sharing. Red line are point estimates and blue dotted line are 95% confidence bands. The set of 
countries comprises Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. 
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